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What Dewey Knew. The Public as
Problem, Practice, and Art
Laura Bieger
Nothing so sharpens one’s appreciation for democracy than bearing witness to its
demolition. 
Jill Lepore
1 In the face of the Brexit referendum and the Trump election, the 2016 Word of the Year
Award  was  bad  news  for  democracy  lovers.  Its  winner,  “post-truth”—defined  as
“relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in
shaping public opinion than appeal to emotion and personal belief”— crystallized the
fragility  of  participatory  politics  in  the  failure  of  the  public  to  act  as  public.1
Scholarship on the public has grappled with the question if and how publics can act as
long as the idea of the public as a political actor exists. And if the term most often
coupled with “post-truth” is “politics” it is important to bear in mind that a particular
aspect  of  democratic  politics  (or  the  failure  thereof)  was  responsible  for  the
skyrocketing use of the term and its Word of the Year selection. “Post-truth politics”
are participatory politics gone bad; politics in which the collective (and mass-mediated)
practice of deliberation through which democratic publics exist has succumbed to the
emotional  mobilization  of  charismatic  spin  doctors,  be  they  democratically  elected
politicians or self-appointed (social) media pundits.
2 So yes, the present situation reminds us that the concept and practice of deliberation,
which is key to the project of participatory democracy, both appeals to and relies on a
collective process of establishing common ground in the form of “shared truths.” And if
“post-truth  politics”  strategically  aligns  itself  with  philosophical  traditions  such  as
pragmatism and postmodernism and their  claims  that  truth  is  socially  constructed
rather than metaphysically imposed, it is our job as scholars to make clear that the
present “post-truth” threat to democracy (and the populist appeal of the term itself)
lies not in a relativist, anti-foundational understanding of truth. The threat of “post-
truth politics” lies in its politically motivated assault on democratic procedure. It lies,
in other words, in exploiting the emotional and the personal (which happen to be the
main  currencies  of  interaction  and  engagement  in  the  world  of  social  media)  to
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suspend, and possibly destroy, the protocols of social interaction and engagement on
which  participatory  politics  relies  in its  need  to  establish  common  ground  in  a
continuous process of defining “things public” (or res publics). Such “things” are valued
not out of “personal” or “special interest,” but out of “common interest.” But what
‘common interests’ are is hardly obvious. Defining them takes deliberation—the careful
and  extended,  discussion-based  consideration  of  options,  which  intersects  and
interacts  with  other  political  practices,  such  as  decision  making,  jurisdiction,  and
voting.2 
3 As  this  collective,  reflective  practice,  deliberation—in the  circular  motion  that  is  a
staple of all performative acts—brings forth both the actor (the public) and object of its
engagement (res publica). The public is a political actor that knows (and constitutes)
itself  by knowing (and defining) its  interests.  Which also means that debates about
what the public is and does, how it can articulate itself and act, are—in their peculiar,
self-reflective circularity—a driving force in the deliberative process that is the root of
democratic  politics.  This  essay takes  the  present  “post  truth” threat  to  democratic
politics as an occasion to revisit John Dewey’s view of the public as a political actor that
is  both  indispensible  for  the  project  of  modern  democracy  and  vulnerable  to  self-
effacement. Part of what makes this exercise so enticing is Dewey’s ambition to have an
impact in this debate. The Public and Its Problems (1927) is Dewey’s most substantial work
of political  philosophy, for sure.  But its  immediate goal was to remedy the public’s
capacity  for  political  action.  In  writing  and publishing  this  book,  Dewey  sought  to
restore  faith  in  democratic  politics  and  procedures  at  a  time  when  fascism  and
totalitarianism were one the rise (and a new social medium, the radio, emerged). And if
this  goal  has  renewed  relevance  today  Dewey’s  view  of  the  public  is  all  the  more
instructive since it is grounded in concerns about what counts as truth and how the
public is involved in determining it.  The opening lines of The Public and Its Problems
could indeed very well be an intervention in current debates about the intertwined
states (or fates) of truth and democracy:
If one wishes to realize the distance which may lie between ‘facts’ and the meaning
of facts, let one go to the field of social discussion. Many persons seem to suppose
that facts carry their meaning along with themselves on their face.  Accumulate
enough  of  them,  and  their  interpretation  stares  at  you.  The  development  of
physical science is thought to confirm the idea. But the power of physical facts to
coerce belief does not reside in bare phenomena. It proceeds from method, from
the technique of research and calculation.… Take away from physical science its
laboratory apparatus and its mathematical technique, and the human imagination
might run wild in its theories of interpretation even if we suppose the brute facts to
remain the same. (3)
4 The realm of  science is  a  remarkable point  of  departure in Dewey’s  “search of  the
public” (3). This choice is programmatic insofar as it allows him to establish from the
get-go  that  even  in  the  realm  of  science,  knowledge  and  truth  are  products  of
interpretation.  Dewey  firmly  believes  that  science  has  no  privileged  access  to
knowledge  whatsoever;  like  all  other  attempts  at  knowing  the  world,  it  seeks  to
understand the meaning of a certain phenomenon in a given context. And just like all
other attempts at knowing the world, science is guided by the concepts and goals that
humans—as thinking and judging beings—bring to the problem at hand. Which means
that selection and judgment are at work in any effort of knowing the world. Knowledge
itself is bound up with the concrete conditions of human life, in which one sample or
piece  of  information  is  chosen  over  another  based  on  certain  evaluative  criteria.
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“Knowledge is a function of association and communication; it depends upon tradition,
upon tools  and methods socially  transmitted,  developed and sanctioned,” he writes
(158). Which leads him to conclude that our attempts at knowing the world result in
opinion rather than truth; and that, if not even science can deliver “the truth” (and not
even  facts  have  irrefutable  meaning),  the  production  of  knowledge  should  be  the
business of a scientific community operating on the basis of democratic principles such
as free speech, rational deliberation, and intersubjective exchange (Kloppenberg 50-54;
see also Dewey, Experience and Nature; “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”). 
5 So, for Dewey, in the absence of absolute truth, a dialogically tested and gauged kind of
knowledge is the best we can get. Moreover, for Dewey (as for Peirce, from whom he
takes the idea), the scientific community is a laboratory of collective, intersubjective
reasoning, and modern democracy is its social equivalent. In democratic as well as in
scientific communities, free and creative individuals conjointly engage in formulating
and testing hypotheses to find out what works best to solve concrete and practical
problems. For Dewey, any dissonance or disjunction between these two groups only
shows that they are not yet living up to the purpose for which they exist—to serve
public interest in a democratic society.3 
6 The epistemic dimension of Dewey’s political philosophy that becomes tangible here
has recently contributed to a new development in democratic theory, which seeks to
establish “the value of democracy on the basis of epistemic merits expected to accrue
from certain democratic procedures” (Estlund 261). Scholars aligning their work with
this idea assume that democracies are inclined to make good decisions because the
decision-making process is grounded in an inclusive and dialogic mode of knowledge
production.4 “Epistemic democrats have developed a cluster of arguments to the effect
that the wisdom of the many can be mobilized by democratic arrangements and that
this provides an important defense of democracy” (Festenstein 218). My discussion of
Dewey’s  views  of  the  public  as  a  political  actor  is  inspired  by  this  line  of  work,
especially by those of its  protagonists (among them James Kloppenburg,  Hilary and
Ruth Anna Putnam, Elizabeth Anderson, and Matthew Festenstein) who turn to Dewey
to  “support  a  view  of  democracy  as  a  collective  exercise  in  practical  intelligence”
(Festenstein  219-20;  here  219).  But  it  also  seeks  to  point  beyond  established
understandings of epistemic democracy in connecting this line of work with Dewey’s
view of communication as art to argue that the aesthetic is assigned with a crucial role
in collectively exercising the practical intelligence that both sustains democracy and
pushes it forward—and that epistemic democrats have overlooked so far.
7 Any  discussion  of  Dewey’s  political  philosophy  must  grapple  with  his  expansive
understanding of democracy. Democracy is, for Dewey, “a tendency built into the very
structure of social activity” (Bybee 49). Dewey developed this “idea of democracy in its
generic social sense” (The Public 147) over the course of his long career. In The Public and
Its Problems, he explains it as follows: 
From the standpoint of  the individual,  it  consists  in having a responsible  share
according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which
one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups
sustain.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  groups,  it  demands  liberation  of  the
potentialities  of  members  of  a  group in  harmony with  the  interests  and  goods
which  are  common.  Since  every  individual  is  a  member  of  many  groups,  this
specification cannot be fulfilled except when different groups interact flexibly and
fully in connection with other groups.… There is a free give-and-take: fullness of
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integrated personality  is  therefore  possible of  achievement,  since  the  pulls  and
responses of different groups reinforce one another and their values accord. (147)
8 Note how democracy is envisioned here not as one among several alternatives to how
social life can be lived, but as its default mode. For Dewey, “[t]he root of democracy is
in  the  social  character  of  human  existence  that  constantly  moves  people  into
community” (Bybee 50). Note further how, for Dewey, democracy is not the realization
(or consummation) of an idea but a social experiment. It is an open-ended process that,
at  best,  evolves  in  ways  beneficial  not  for  individual  members  or  groups,  but  for
everyone belonging to a given society. For Dewey, the public is essential to bringing
about this utopian state, which he emphatically calls the “Great Community” (143).
9 Doing  justice  to  Dewey’s  views  of  the  public  as  political  actor  requires  putting  in
perspective  the  optimism  that  is  surfacing  here  (as  he  did  himself  in  “Creative
Democracy,” a late-career meta-reflection on the topic at hand). Dewey’s unwavering
faith in the possibilities of democracy in the modern age was an antidote to feelings of
doubt that were all too common in his time5—and in the U.S. context perhaps most
powerfully expressed by Walter Lippmann (in a number of publications, including his
two books Public Opinion and The Phantom Public). It is well known that Dewey wrote The
Public and Its Problems in response to Lippmann’s laconic dismissal of the public as a
phantom.6 But while Dewey’s and Lippmann’s views of the public and its significance
for the project of modern democracy could not have been more different, it is worth
noting that both turned to the public in a way of grappling with the growing despair
about the future of democracy that marked their time. The experience of the Great War
had eroded peoples’ faith in the fundamentally rational nature of humankind, and in
the aftermath of the war, attempts to secure a lasting peace built  on Wilson’s Four
Freedoms had been futile, efforts to establish democratic governments in Germany and
Italy were thwarted, and the Bolshevik revolution was challenging the social ideals of
Western democracies.  U.S.  democracy,  too,  was not in a good shape in the thirties,
“weakened by corruption, monopoly capitalism, apathy, inequality, political violence,
hucksterism, racial injustice, unemployment, even starvation” (Lepore 20).
10 Against  this  backdrop  of  geopolitical  turmoil  and  shattered  beliefs,  Lippmann  and
Dewey  formulated  their  opposing  views  on  the  public  and  its  role  in  modern
democracies.  Lippmann,  who  had  severe  doubts  about  the  capacity  of  the  average
citizen to engage in rational self-government, advocated a positivistic science to renew
the project of modern democracy (—and the fact that Dewey uses the realm of science
to embark on his “search for the public” is a direct response to this view). Given the
tendency of individuals to distort what they see (a point that Lippmann had elaborated
in Public Opinion),  participation of the average citizen in democratic procedures was
best  to  be  minimized.  In  fact,  for  Lippmann,  democratic  governance  could  only  be
salvaged  by  grounding  it  in  a  kind  of  knowledge  that  rises  above  subjectivity  and
politics: scientific knowledge. “The Pandora’s box of the relativity of truth,” opened by
scientists  such  as  Einstein  and  Heisenberg,  “would  be  carefully  resealed,  and  line
drawn… between fact and fiction” (Bybee 32)—with such things as “the public” or “the
people” falling on the latter side.  Note how the pattern repeats itself  today,  as the
relativism  of  postmodernism  has  come  to  serve  as  the  scapegoat  for  the  current
problems of democracy. 
11 For Dewey, democracy could not be saved by science (or at least not by science alone)
because science had its own problems. Was it indeed not greatly ironic that science,
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once it had shattered metaphysical truth, claimed for itself a truth that existed outside
of the influence or control of human doing and making? Again, the parallels to critical
paradigms  such  as  new  materialism/positivism,  which  are  en  vogue even  in  the
humanities  today,  are  striking.  And if  a  precursor  of  this  quarrel  set  the  stage  for
Dewey’s book on the public, his point about this kind of science (which he elaborates
most consistently in The Quest of Certainty) is still valid today: a positivistic science can
neither solve the problems of subjectivity nor those of democracy. It “avoids them or
worse, hides them” (Bybee 32). 
12 And while Dewey largely agreed with Lippmann’s diagnosis of the troubled state of
modern democracy—it suffered from the bureaucratization and impersonalization of
modern life  and from the growing power of  economic forces to secure interests  in
government—he believed,  contrary  to  Lippmann,  that  these  problems could  not  be
solved by establishing an intellectual elite that pretended to have access to a truth
untainted by human interests. For Dewey, the only remedy was to revive the public,
which was “eclipsed” (121) rather than being a phantom. So, while Lippmann’s goal was
to save the project of modern democracy by exposing the public as a chimaera, reduce
participation to a bare minimum, and install a technocratic mode of governance, Dewey
wanted to reach the same goal by reanimating the public in a step toward reviving
democracy in  its  encompassing social  sense.  Against  assumptions  of  “the epistemic
superiority of an expert class” (Festenstein 224), Dewey argued that “in the absence of
an articulate voice on the part of the masses, the best do not and cannot remain the
best, the wise cease to be wise.... In the degree to which they become a specialized class,
they are shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serve” (The
Public 206). And if an open and inclusive debate yields epistemically better results, the
expert  class  must  “bind  itself  to  these  processes”  (Festenstein  224).  For  Dewey,
democracy,  in institutionalizing “effective guarantees of  free inquiry,  free assembly
and free communication” (“Creative Democracy,” qdt. in Festenstein 224), creates the
best conditions for this. 
13 How good these conditions are depends to a substantial degree on the public’s capacity
to act as public. For Dewey, this capacity is rooted in a process of collective reflection
grounded in shared experience and communication. And by the latter, Dewey “did not
mean the machinery of  communication” that  interlinks  science,  the  press,  and the
political  system, “but the art  of  communication,  the process by which citizens in a
society came to understand the nature of their interdependence through a system of
shared  meaning”  (or  “truths”)  (Bybee  32).7 For  Dewey,  the  public  is  essential  in
cultivating this art and making political use of it.  I  will  pursue this line of thought
further later on, but first, I want to turn to Jürgen Habermas, whose work on the public
has shaped my understanding of the subject at hand before I read Dewey. Habermas’s
Strukturwandel der  Öffentlichkeit (1964),  published  in  English  much  later  as
Transformations of the Public Sphere (1989), was formative for my view of the public as a
political agent that acts (and knows itself) through mass-mediated communication, and
as a literary scholar I was (and still am) intrigued by the lucidity and consequence with
which he grounds the public’s capacity for political action in reading (and) literature.
But I also agree with his critics that, for understanding the heterogeneous, pluralist,
and conflicted nature of the public as a staple of modern democracies, the Habermasian
model is limited and ultimately limiting (see specially Fraser; Warner, Publics; Squires.)
And yet,  reading Habermas  in  tandem with  Dewey makes  both the  merits  and the
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limitations of Habermas’s influential model of the public as a political actor especially
tangible. But to my knowledge, this is rarely done.
14 In  my  attempt  to  start  filling  this  gap,  I  want  to  open  with  the  thrust  of  the
Habermasian model  of  the public  as  a  political  actor:  the assumption that  printing
technology  brought  into  the  world  new forms  of  publicness,  which  prompted  new
forms  of  politics.8 Habermas  traces  the  shift  from  a  pre-modern, “representative
publicness,” mediated through visible signs of status and power and residing in their
public display, to a modern, discursive publicness, mediated through print discourse
and residing in a shared use of texts in Transformations of the Public Sphere (5-26; see also
Warner, “Publics” 62-68). The story that unfolds from here is by now a familiar one.
With its appeal to reason and objectivity, its spirit of collective evaluation and debate,
and its capacity to invoke a sense of connectedness among readers who were strangers
to each other, the discursive publicness of print was key to generating “the political
structures of modernity” (Warner, Letters xi). It was indeed print-based publicness that
tied communicative exchange and deliberation to political institutions and practices in
ways that turned them into political practices in their own right. We find a kernel of
this thought in The Public and Its Problems, where Dewey writes: “a thing is only fully
known when it is published, shared, socially accessible. Record and communication are
indispensible  to  knowledge”  (178).  But  it  was  Habermas  who  first  gave  systematic
thought to how print-based publicness became a “training ground” (Public Sphere 29)
for the political practice of deliberation. 
15 For Habermas, the public emerges as a political actor when private people start making
use of their reason in public. This was possible because in modern societies, the private,
intimate realm of the domestic sphere had become the site at which a new, audience-
oriented  mode  of  subjectivity  was  being  forged;  a  mode  of  subjectivity  trained  by
reading sentimental  novels  and writing letters  and diaries,  which turned out  to  be
highly compatible and indeed very well suited to perform in the “coffee houses, salons
and Tischgesellschaften” (51) that were formative sites of the literary public sphere. The
political  agency  emerging  from  these  sites  was  grounded  in  an  imagined  web  of
“intimate mutual relationships between privatized individuals,” authors and readers
weeping over the fate of invented actors, who, in doing so, “themselves [became] actors
who ‘talked heart to heart’” (50). Note how the practice of deliberation rehearsed under
these conditions was not cool or withdrawn but emotionally engaged. We are touching
on a neuralgic point of the public’s political agency here: how to reconcile the need for
rational  and emotional  mobilization at  work in summoning a public  into existence.
Both are needed, yet any theory that assigns the public with a capacity for political
agency must attest human beings with the capacity to be rational. But what does it
mean (or take) to be rational? For the Habermas of Transformations of the Public Sphere,
reason is grounded in communicative exchange and sentimental education. And while
the  latter  recedes  into  the  background  in  his  subsequent  work,  the  idea  that
democratic  reason  (and  collective  intelligence)  is  fostered  in  free  communication
becomes the backbone of Habermas’s theory of communicative action, where reason is
universalized as an potentially progressive propensity that,  due to natural yet non-
coercive  tendencies  inherent  in  human  communication,  prompts  humankind  to
collaborate  (Habermas,  Theorie  des  Kommunikativen  Handelns;  see  also  Kloppenberg
74-75). 
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16 Dewey anticipates these ideas in some of the works predating The Public and Its Problems
(especially  in  Democracy  and  Education  and  Experience  and  Nature).  “Long  before
Habermas published his magnum opus on communicative action, Dewey concluded that
humanity had yet to understand the significance of,  and the potential benefits that
could  be  generated,  by  socializing  and  systematizing  democratic  communication”
(Dotts 114; see also Kloppenberg 74-76).  In The Public and Its  Problems,  Dewey states:
“Knowledge,” i.e. the product of using one’s reason, “is a function of association and
communication;  it  depends  upon  tradition,  upon  tools  and  methods  socially
transmitted,  developed  and  sanctioned”  (158). Or:  “No  man  or  no  mind  was  ever
emancipated  merely  by  being  left  alone”  (168).  And  later  (in  “Democracy  and
Educational Administration”) he writes:
The foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of human nature; faith in
human intelligence, and in the power of pooled and cooperative experience. It is
not belief that these things are complete but that if given a show they will grow and
be  able  to  generate  progressively  the  knowledge  and  wisdom  needed  to  guide
collective action. (qtd. in Festenstein 219)
17 Habermas had not read Dewey when writing his habilitation on the public sphere in the
early  1960s,  but  he later  acknowledged the major influence that  Dewey could have
easily been (Habermas, “Postscript” 228). And it is indeed striking that both thinkers
reach  a  similar  conclusion:  communication  based  on  democratic  principles  assigns
publics with an epistemic role. In this view, communication is not merely a transmitter
of knowledge, but a proactive participant in creating a system of shared meanings (see
also Bybee 55). 
18 Both Transformations  of  the  Public  Sphere  and The Public  and Its  Problems envision the
possibilities of modern democracy that manifest themselves in the public’s capacity for
political action as gauged by concrete material structures and hermeneutic procedures.
And  quite  different  from  the  universalizing  tendencies  of  Habermas’s  later  works,
Transformations  of  the  Public  Sphere  pays  close  attention  to  the  historically  specific
practices of reading and reading communities that sustain the public’s political agency.
In doing so (and this is one of the great virtues of this book), it brings literature into
view as  a  social practice  that  is  instrumental  in  forging audience-oriented subjects
inclined to engage in public debate. For Habermas, the new forms of democratic politics
enabled by this development crystallize in the birth of the democratic idea of rule of
law:
The criteria of generality and abstractness characterizing legal norms had to have a
peculiar obviousness for privatized individuals who, by communicating with each
other  in  the  public  sphere  of  the  world  of  letters,  confirmed  each  other’s
subjectivity as it emerged from their spheres of intimacy. For as a public they were
already under the implicit law of the parity of all cultivated persons, whose abstract
universality afforded the sole guarantee that the individuals subsumed under it in
an  equally  abstract  fashion,  as  ‘common  human  beings,’  were  set  free  in  their
subjectivity precisely by this parity. (Public Sphere 54)
19 So  yes,  for  Habermas  the  discursive  publicness  afforded  by  print  was  essential  to
bringing forth the public as a political actor and to institutionalizing deliberation as the
political practice that sustains its existence and agency. And yet, he seems to assume
that  this  agency  can  best  be  asserted  in  communicative  situations—i.e.  the
aforementioned  “coffee  houses,  salons and  Tischgesellschaften”  (51)—that  allow for  a
presumably transparent and direct form of intersubjective exchange. And this means
that the mediated activity of reading is relegated to the second tear, whereas direct
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intersubjective exchange is viewed as the most valuable form of participation. But does
not his own example of how profoundly reading sentimental novels has affected the
formation of an audience-oriented subjectivity contradict this assumption in showing
that the face-to-face is never fully transparent? That the language we use, the forms of
address we choose, the modes of deliberation available to us, the purpose and aim of
our speech, that all these features of communication are deeply pervaded by our media
use? This blind spot about the fundamental opacity of communication is all the more
problematic as it comes in tow with a wholesale rejection of modern mass media, of
which print—in advancing the commodification of culture by catering to the appetites
of the (predominantly bourgeois) reading public (29)—is an early harbinger.
20 How does Habermas’s view of the public as a political actor that both depends upon and
is impaired by modern mass media compare to Dewey’s? If the Habermasian model is
technologically grounded (in the shift in the social fabric of modern life brought about
by what Benedict Anderson has called the rise of “print capitalism”), Dewey’s model is
grounded in shared experience, with negative experience being the strongest incentive
for shared experience. The account of how experience is shared and how this process
can generate common interest and public self-awareness deserves a lengthy quotation:
Conjoint, combined, associated action is a universal trait of the behavior of things.
Such  actions  have  results.  Some  of  the  results  of  human  collective  actions  are
perceived, that is, they are noted in such ways that they are taken account of. Then
there arise purposes, plans, measures and means to secure consequences which are
liked and eliminate those which are found obnoxious. Thus perception generates a
common  interest;  that  is,  those  affected  by  the  consequences  are  perforce
concerned in conduct of  all  those who along with themselves share in bringing
about  results.  Sometimes  the  consequences  are  confined  to  those  who  directly
share  in  the  transaction  which  produces  them.  In  other  cases  they  extend  far
beyond  those  engaged  in  producing  them.  Thus  two  kinds  of  interests  and  of
measures of regulation of acts in view of consequences are generated. In the first,
interest  and  control  are  limited  to  those  directly  engaged;  in  the  second,  they
extend to those who do not directly share in the performance of acts. If, then, the
interest constituted by their being affected by the actions in question is to have any
practical influence, control over the actions which produce them must occur by
some indirect means.
     So far the statements, it is submitted, set forth matters of ascertainable fact. Now
follows the hypothesis. Those indirectly affected for good or for evil form a group
distinctive enough to deserve a name. The name selected is The Public. (The Public
34-35)
21 Note how, for Dewey, collective response to negative experience not only summons the
public into being; it can move democracy forward. An “ontology of becoming” (Crick,
Democracy 37) animates his universe of thought, and this ontology also shapes his view
of the public. His language underscores this conviction: “When Dewey speaks of ‘the
public,’ his words are words of process, of transformation, of undergoing. The task is to
‘call a public into existence,’ meaning the task is to forge a version of ‘the public’ able to
overcome intelligently the obstacles before it” (Stob 235). Which also means: he is less
interested in what the public is and more interested in what it does; which is essentially:
how it orients itself toward what it can become. 
22 Moreover,  and  crucially,  in  Dewey’s  progressive  model,  the  formation  of  the
democratic state grows out of the formation of the public. “The public is organized and
made  effective  by  means  of  representatives…  association  adds  to  itself  political
organization, and something which may be government comes into being: the public is
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a political state” (The Public 35). But at the same time, Dewey views the public as an
antagonistic force: “to form itself, the public has to break existing political forms. This
is hard because the forms are themselves the regular means of institutional change”
(31). In contrast to Habermas, who fails to acknowledge the plural, heterogeneous and
conflicted nature of the public in modern democratic societies, Dewey’s public is non-
unitary,  diversified—oppositional  by  nature.  Yet  while  the  structural  antagonism
between  publics  and  counter-publics  is  by  now  viewed  as  a  staple  of  modern
democracies, and scholarship on the subject is proliferating, the Habermasian model
remains the default point of reference while Dewey’s work goes largely unnoticed.9 
23 This is all the more unfortunate since the dominance of the Habermasian model levels
tensions between different traditions of thought on the subject that may help us gain a
firmer grasp on how the deliberative processes that assign democratic publics with
their  role  as  political  actors  are  sustained  by  different  political  and  intellectual
cultures. European thinkers from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to Jürgen Habermas tend to
envision democratic publics as capable of expressing (or at least moving toward) an
ideal of consensus: If those engaged in deliberation are sufficiently rational they will
conjointly articulate what the public wants. The relative ease with which thinkers of
this tradition subscribe to unifying ideas such as the ‘public good’ springs from this
consensus trajectory. In contrast, U.S. thinkers from James Madison via John Dewey to
Michael  Warner  tend  to  conceive  of  the  public  as  genuinely  fractured  by  rivalling
interests. In this scenario, democracy must be based on a model of governance capable
of containing the resulting tensions and conflicts—a procedural model that was for the
first time fully expressed in Federalist Paper 10, where “Publius” a.k.a. Madison argues
that an “extended republic” is better suited than a small republic to protect public
interest against special interest (the interest of ‘factions’, in the language of the time). 
24 In  contrast  to  the  consensus-oriented  models  of  the  public  that  vastly  influence
scholarship on the public to this day, Dewey envisions a public that moves from conflict
to  conflict;  or  rather,  from  experiment  to  experiment.  Conceived  as  a  collective
response to negative experience, the public cannot cease to exist. “The public consists
of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an
extent that it  is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared
for” (The Public 12). But it can cease to do the things that make response to negative
experience collectively felt and heard. “Recognition of evil consequences brought about
a common interest which required for its maintenance measures and rules, together
with the selection of certain persons as their guardians, interpreters, and, if need be,
their executors” (13). The crucial term here is recognition—“recognition of itself” (77)
and recognition of  its  common interests.  “It  is  not  that  there is  no public,”  Dewey
writes, “no large body of persons having a common interest in the consequences of
social transactions. There is too much public, a public too diffused and scattered and
too intricate in composition. And there are too many publics” (137). Only when the
public is sufficiently aware of itself and its interests can it properly function. And for
Dewey, this is “primarily and essentially an intellectual problem” (126)—a problem that
can be solved by means of  communication in the sense of  a  democratic,  public  art
mentioned above and to which I now want to return. 
25 In assessing how Dewey envisions the realization of this art, it is crucial to bear in mind
that his model of a public coming into being in response to shared experience raises the
cognitive question of how individual experience becomes collective, shared experience.
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This  process  requires  reflection,  interpretation,  and  communication,  yes.  But  if
assigned  with  a  political  function  in  modern  democratic  societies  it  also  requires
communication technology. For Dewey, the sheer fact that negative experience creates
a need to be shared forms a practical link between communication and technology.
This  link is  a  given rather than a structural  hazard.  And in addressing what keeps
communication in his times from realizing his ideal of communication as democratic
art, Dewey contends that the “physical tools of communication” (142) are not properly
used.  So,  contrary  to  Habermas’s  view that  public  discourse  is,  from its  inception,
threatened by its  structural  dependence on modern mass media,  for Dewey,  a  fully
realized  democratic  art  of  communication  must  absorb  the  benefits  of  new
communication technologies. “When the machine age has… perfected its machinery, it
will be a means of life and not its despotic master. Democracy will come into its own,
for democracy is the name for a life of free and enriching communion” (The Public 184;
on Dewey and communication technology see also Richard).
26 Realizing the utopian potential of communication as democratic art also depends on
the availability of signs and symbols to members of a given social group to convey the
sense of shared experience that, according to Dewey, is foundational to defining the
common interest  through which a  public  knows itself.  Next  to  (and in conjunction
with) the improper use of the existing communication technology, Dewey deems an
impoverished language responsible  for the unrealized potential  of  the public  art  of
communication at his time. I have discussed Dewey’s argument about how signs and
symbols  are  needed to create a  robust  system of  shared meanings,  and how “their
dissemination in print” (The Public 218) is crucial to creating this system elsewhere (see
my “Reading for Democracy). For the present purpose suffice it to say that, if Habermas
views literature and the literary public  sphere as  a  vital  “training ground” for  the
audience-oriented subjectivity that lends political agency to the collective, reflective
practice of deliberation, Dewey assigns literature with a key role in generating new
signs and symbols for the democratic art of communication. And by using these signs
and symbols  in  ways  that  transform the  force  of  experience  into  collective  action,
“[p]oetry,  the  drama,  the  novel  are  proofs  that  the  problem of  presentation is  not
insoluble. Artists have always been the real purveyors of news, for it is not the outward
happening in itself  which is  new but the kindling by it  of  emotion,  perception and
appreciation” (183). 
27 So  yes,  similar  to  Habermas,  Dewey  assigns  literature  with  a  vital  role  in  the
constitution  of  the  public  as  a  political  actor.10 In  Habermas’s  technology-/media-
oriented model, literature features as a social practice that provides the scripts and
infrastructure in and through which deliberation becomes a political tool. In Dewey’s
experience-based model, in which political agency depends on the realization of the
democratic  potential  of  communication,  literature  features  as  a  distinctly  aesthetic
practice with a transformative capacity to move democracy forward. For Habermas,
literature is both essential to the constitution of democratic publics and a driving force
in its  decline.  It  is  closely  involved in creating audience-oriented subjects  ready to
engage in  political  deliberation and a  network of  actors  and spaces  through which
deliberation  can  assert  political  power,  but  it  is  also  part  of  a  dynamic  of
commodification  that  is  bound  to  impair  this  power.  Dewey’s  view  of  literature’s
contribution  in  creating  a  robust  public  is  less  conflicted.  He  trusts  literature’s
capacities to transform social interaction through its art of communication. Yet he, too,
views the face-to-face mode as the gold standard of democratic communication and
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deliberation. “Systematic and continuous inquiry into all the conditions which affect
association and their dissemination in print is a precondition of the creation of a true
public,”  he writes.  “But it  and its  results  are tools  after  all.  Their  final  actuality  is
accomplished in face-to-face relationships by means of direct give and take” (The Public
218).  But  if  Dewey’s  view on the public’s  capacity  for  political  action also  lacks  an
awareness of the fundamental opacity and mediatedness of the face-to-face, his vision
of democratic communication is open to accommodating communication technology.
In  fact,  for  Dewey,  the  utopian  state  of  perfect  communication  that  lets  public
discourse  flow  freely  demands  that  communication  technology  is  subsumed  in  a
community’s democratic intentions.
28 To  conclude:  my  reading  of  Dewey’s  The  Public  and  Its  Problems in  tandem  with
Habermas and in resonance with current efforts to provide an epistemic justification of
democracy  opens  three  trajectories  for  future  scholarship  on  the  public  and  its
capacities  for  political  action.  Scholars  interested  in  the  structural  tensions  and
antagonisms that mark modern democratic publics may gain a firmer grasp on the
matter by juxtaposing conflict/experiment and consensus models of deliberation and
by placing these models in their respective critical and political traditions. Scholars
interested  in  Dewey’s  vision  of  “democracy  as  a  collective  exercise  in  practical
intelligence”  (Festenstein  219)  may see  that  they  need to  start  reckoning  with  the
impact  that  communication  technology  has  on  the  progressive  and  inclusive
generation  of  knowledge  and wisdom.  And  last  but  not  least,  scholars  from  both
traditions may see that a comprehensive account of Dewey’s view of the public as a
political actor must engage both with the epistemic dimension of modern mass media
and with the epistemic dimension—the practical  knowledge—of literature.  If  Dewey
knew  that  unleashing  the  public’s  capacity  for  political  action  depends  on  uniting
communication technology and literary art  it  takes the work of  media and literary
scholars to spell out these implications today.
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NOTES
1. www.languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016.  It  is  no
coincidence that  2016 marks the year  when the Democracy Index,  which rates  one
hundred and sixty-seven countries every year, for the first time listed U.S. democracy
as a ‘flawed democracy’. See Lepore 21.
2. This praxeological understanding of deliberation, and by extension of the public as an actor
brought forth by the practice of deliberation, draws on the work of scholars associated with the
recent ‘practice turn’ in social theory. For a useful introduction, see Schatzki.
3. This  view  of  the  relation  between  the  scientific  community  and  the  public  draws  on
Kloppenberg.  An early line of criticism of Dewey’s political thought has seen this analogy as
indicative of a reductive and technocratic view of political democracy. Recent scholarship has
countered this interpretation with one that views Dewey as “a theorist of popular contention—of
class  struggle,  strike  action,  social  movements,  industrial  democracy,  civil  disobedience,  and
coercive political action.” See Festenstein 220-22; here 221.
4. Estlund  clarifies:  “Epistemic  approaches  do  not  assume  that  actually  existing
democracies make good decisions, or even that greatly improved arrangements would
lead  to  predominantly  good  decisions.  What  makes  them  count  as  epistemic
approaches  is  their  holding  that  an  adequate  normative  theory  of  democracy’s
legitimacy,  authority,  or  justification  depends  partly  on  some  tendency  of  (some)
democratic arrangements to make good political decisions by aiming to do so” (262).
5. Lepore  reminds  us  in  a  recent  essay,  launching  a  New  Yorker series  on  “The  Future  of
Democracy,” that town halls,  radio and newspaper debates about the meaning and future of
democracy were a staple of U.S. public culture in the thirties. 
6. I am closely following Bybee’s lucid discussion of the Lippmann-Dewey “debate” (and the first
thing that Bybee points out is that “debate” is a euphemism for a one-sided response by Dewey to
Lippmann’s widely received view on the topic). 
7. Scholarship on Dewey’s view of communication as art abounds. See especially Crick, Dewey’s
Aesthtics; Mattern; Stroud.
8. The following passages on Habermas and Dewey rehearse and expand on arguments that I
have made elsewhere. See my “Reading for Democracy” and “Learning from Hannah Arendt.”
9. For a rare example, see Asen.
10. It  should be  mentioned that,  in  The  Public  and  Its  Problems,  this  role  is  assigned but  not
explicated. Dewey fleshes it out in other writings, especially in Democracy and Education. For an in-
depth discussion, see Waks.
ABSTRACTS
This essay takes the present “post truth” threat to democratic politics as an occasion to revisit
John Dewey’s view of the public as a political actor that is both indispensible for the project of
modern  democracy  and  vulnerable  to  self-effacement. Drawing  on  a  recent  development  in
democratic theory—epistemic democracy—that is in part inspired by Dewey, I trace how Dewey’s
relativist  understanding of  truth animates his  views of  the public  as  a  political  actor and of
democracy as a “collective exercise in practical  intelligence” (Festenstein).  But in linking the
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epistemic  thrust  of  Dewey’s  political  theory  with  his  view  of  communication  as  art, I move
beyond  established  understandings  of  epistemic  democracy  to  argue  that  the  aesthetic  is
assigned with a key role in collectively exercising the practical intelligence that both sustains
democracy and moves it forward—and that epistemic democrats have overlooked so far.
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